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INTRODUCTION
No subject separates torts scholars from practitioners more than proximate

cause. It seems to compete with the rule against perpetuities as the primary bane of
first year law students' existence,' and most practicing lawyers are even less able
to coherently discuss its twists and turns than they were as students. Coherence is
likely too generous awordto describe torts scholars' renditions ofproximate cause,
but at least we enjoy discussing it. Most practitioners would prefer not to think
about it2 except in the rare cases confronting them where it is actually at issue. And
when it is at issue, a practicing attorney's encounter with the doctrine is intensely
practical. Her bottom line is far removed from angels and pinheads; rather she is

* Professor of Law & Associate Dean, Academics, Pepperdine University School of Law. I
would like to thank Professor James Gash for his helpful comments on an early draft of this Essay.
Responsibility for errors is of course mine alone. Participating in a Symposium dedicated to Gary
Schwartz is a special honor. My favorite memory of Gary stems from attending a Los Angeles
Dodgers baseball game with him a few years ago. I had long been in awe of his scholarship; at the
Dodgers game I developed new awe over his knowledge of baseball-it seemed that there were no
player or team statistics that were beyond the range of his formidable mind. Over time I also learned
that he loved to play tennis, eat good food, and talk about important social issues far removed from
tort law. In short, I learned that he was a vibrant, multifaceted, and engaging person. A few months
ago one of his long-time colleagues at UCLA nearly cried when talking with me about Gary's death.
He will of course be remembered as one of the most prominent torts scholars of our time. He will also
be remembered as a sincere and good man.
1. I still remember the shock I experienced when, after having dragged through three weeks of
proximate cause doctrinal sludge as a student, my bar review course lecturer spent about three minutes
on it, advising us to simply memorize the phrase "reasonably foreseeable" and a list of intervening
causes that are generally considered superceding or not superceding.
2. Similar to their preference not to think about traumas experienced in military service, having
their heart broken in a failed romance, or clothing that they wore during the mid-1970s.
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focused on communicating to the judge and jury in as straightforward a manner as
possible why and how the proximate cause element works to her client's advantage.
Recently the American Law Institute (ALI) began its third effort at the daunting
challenge of restating proximate cause with the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts: LiabilityforPhysicalHarm(BasicPrinciples).3 In this undertaking, the ALI
will attempt to accommodate practitioners' needs for clarity and relative
straightforwardness with the need often highlighted by scholars for recognition of
the doctrine's myriad subtleties and complexities. The Restatement should be as
simple as possible, but without sacrificing doctrinal accuracy and completeness.
As the ALI struggles with how best to accomplish this delicate balancing, its
project is likely to reinvigorate interest and debate regarding tort law's problem
child. This Essay seeks to add modestly to the discussion by providing some
musings on two facets of the proximate cause puzzle: appropriate language for a
black-letter, proximate cause test and how the doctrine may be distinctive when
applied to products liability cases. The Essay begins with a few thoughts on the
proposed Basic Principles Restatement's formulation of proximate cause and
proceeds to address how various products liability doctrines and defenses might
uniquely color proximate cause analyses in such cases.
II. RISKY LANGUAGE
The basic principles of proximate cause have not changed much since the
1930s, but the ALI's restatements of it have. Indeed, in each of the three efforts the
ALI has made at restating proximate cause, it has employed different approaches.
The first, second, and proposed third Restatements all seem to agree that the phrase
"proximate cause" is undesirable,4 but they take different paths in seeking to
identify appropriate labels and tests. The FirstRestatement adopted the phrase
"legal cause" as a substitute for proximate cause language.5 Although the courts did
not respond favorably to this effort,6 the Second Restatement continued utilization
of "legal cause" language.7 The Second Restatement introduced some changes to
the proximate cause formulation, such as adding language to section 435 indicating
that a highly-extraordinary-in-hindsight test is appropriate in determining
foreseeability of harm -another concept that has not fared well with the courts.
Neither the first nor the second Restatements faithfully reflected the language or,

3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
(Tentative Draft No.23, 2002) [hereinafter BASIC PRINCIPLES].
4. See id. § 29, cmts. a, b; Special Note on Proximate Cause.
5. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 431 (1934) ("Legal Cause; What Constitutes").
6. See BASICPRINCIPLES, supranote 3, § 26 cmt. a ("Despite the venerability of the 'legal cause'
term in Restatement history, it has not been widely adopted in judicial and legal discourse nor is it
helpful in explicating the ground that it covers.").
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) ("What Constitutes Legal Cause").
8. Id. § 435(2) ("The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another
where after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to
the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm.").
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in some respects, the approaches utilized by the courts, and the Restatements'
efforts to steer the courts to new language and approaches met with failure.9
Thus, the proposed ThirdRestatement is going back to the drawing board for
language and conceptualizations that will be more helpful and acceptable to the
courts. Rejecting both "proximate cause" and "legal cause" as black letter
descriptions, it adopts the chapter title "Scope of Liability" followed by the phrase
"Proximate Cause" in parentheses and proposes the following black-letter rule as
its basic approach: "An actor is not liable for harm different from the harms whose
risks made the actor's conduct tortious. ' " The comments following the proposed
rule refer to it as a "risk standard."'" Other scholars have described it as a "resultwithin-the-risk" test.2
Although some criticisms and concerns are appropriate, the proposed Third
Restatement's result-within-the-risk approach is superior to the presentations of
proximate cause in previous Restatements. The earlierRestatementstook piecemeal
approaches to proximate cause, vaguely addressing it (and sometimes just appearing
to be addressing it)"3 in several different and often overlapping sections, and
blending it together with the much different issue of factual causation. The
proposed ThirdRestatement's proximate cause for physical harm rule is blessedly
succinct, centralized, and clear in comparison.
The value of clarity in a restatement should not be underestimated. I once heard
a United States Supreme Court Justice remark to a small group that the high court
must struggle to make its rulings accessible and readily comprehensible to the often
hurried and harried "Judge Sixpack."'14 Although we might want to find a way to
state it more gently, the challenge is the same with restatements. Lawyers and
judges look to restatements for an authoritative source on the concrete legal issues
confronting their busy lives. If a restatement allows concerns for addressing all
contingencies to make it vague and rambling, it risks being ignored. Similarly, if a
restatement embraces too much linguistic or doctrinal creativity, when it is possible
to instead simply restatd the courts' dominant approach to an issue, it risks
irrelevance.
Although the proposed ThirdRestatement's proximate cause section is a vast
improvement over earlierRestatements,cause for concern arises on this latter point.
9. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 26 cmt a.
10. Id. § 29. The proposed Restatement also provides guidance on other aspects of proximate
cause, such as the thin-skull plaintiff rule and the role of intervening causes, but this analysis focuses
only on the basic test for limiting liability.
11. Id. cmt.f.
12. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intuitionand Technology in Product
DesignLitigation:An Essay on ProximateCausation,88 GEO.L.J 659,671 (2000); Peter Zablotsky,
EliminatingProximateCauseas an Element ofthe PrimaFacie Casefor StrictProductsLiability, 45
CATH. U. L. REV.31, 42 (1995).
13. The proposed Basic Principles Restatement's Reporters note, for example, that the
substantial factor requirement for legal cause in the first and second Restatements has often been
understood to address proximate cause, "although that was not the intent of those documents." BASIC
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 29 cmt. a.
14. Presumably not to be confused with his better-known brother, Joe Sixpack.
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The proposed Third Restatement is succinct and to the point, but it seeks to lead
courts to language they do not, for the most part, presently use. At present, courts
typically employ unadorned foreseeability language rather than result-within-therisk language when analyzing proximate cause.' 5 Also, of course, most courts
continue to use the phrase "proximate cause," which the proposed Restatement
relegates to a chapter heading parenthetical. 6
These changes from the language predominantly used by courts and lawyers
raise the time-honored question of when the restatements should follow the courts,
and when they should seek to lead them. Stated another way, when should
restatements focus on "is," and when should they focus on "ought"? 7
Except in areas truly crying out for reform, I tend to lean toward the notion that
restatements should follow more than they lead. They likely garner more respect,
and more relevance, when the legal community senses that the restatements are
thoughtful and accurate reflections of the courts' dominant approaches to legal
issues. In some instances following the courts is impractical, because the decisions
are jumbled or hopelessly confused, and in such situations the restatements need to
say what the law ought to be. However, I suspect that the natural desire to make
improvements even when the majority approach is relatively clear may sometimes

come through too strongly-particularly given that outstanding academics, who
excel at critiquing the status quo and searching for creative solutions, typically serve
as the restatements' reporters.' s

15. The Reporters assert that there is a "trend toward... ascendancy" for the result-within-therisk standard in the courts. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 29 cmt. j. However, they seem to be
including within this trend cases using reasonable foreseeability language, which they describe as "its
equivalent in negligence cases." Id. In fact, courts' use ofresult-within-the-risk language is relatively
rare in comparison with less specific reasonable foreseeability language.
16. See, e.g., Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 265-66 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he
plaintiff must show that this failure to warn the physician was both a cause in fact and the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury."); McGrath v. Gen. Motors Corp., 26 Fed. Appx. 506, 511 (6th Cir.
2002) (stating that under Ohio law, the plaintiff must prove that design "defect was the proximate
cause of his injuries").
17. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing InstitutionalMemories: Wisconsin and the
American Law Institute, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1, 20-24 (addressing history of ALI debate and whether
restatements of black-letter law should focus on "is" or "ought").
18. Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability provides a recent
example of controversy over whether a restatement is providing an "is" or an "ought" with regard to
case law. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 6(c) (1998) [hereinafter PRODUCTS
LIABILITY RESTATEMENT].

Although the Reporters' work on the ProductsLiabilityRestatement was

heroic, the case law supporting section 6(c)'s "reasonable physician test" for prescription product
design liability is scant at best, and several writers (myself included) believe that the cases point in
another direction. See Richard L. Cupp Jr., The ContinuingSearchforProperPerspective: Whose
ReasonablenessShould Be at Issue in a PrescriptionProductDesign Defect Analysis?, 30 SETON
HALL L. REV. 233,246-52 (1999) (summarizing scholars' mostly critical analyses of the prescription
product design standard crafted in section 6); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug
Designs Are Different, 111 YALE L. J. 151, 151 n.2 (2001) (citing mostly critical analyses of the
section 6 design standard). However, the Reporters insist that their standard captures the spirit of the
case law in the area, and that it "seeks to clarify ambiguities that have haunted this area of law for
almost three decades." Aaron D. Twerski, Inside the Restatement, 24 PFPP. L. REv. 839, 852-53

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss4/14

4

Cupp: Proximate Cause, the Proposed Basic Principles Restatement, and P
2002]

PROXIMATE CAUSE

1089

One could argue that the proposed ThirdRestatement'srejection of reasonable
foreseeability language and adoption of a result-within-the-risk standard succumbs
to this temptation toward undue tinkering, but the evidence is mixed. Certainly the
result-within-the-risk standard is not a whole cloth creation; its language is used
occasionally by courts"9 and, as the Reporters point out, in most cases it is
"essentially consistent" with the reasonable foreseeability test.20 The Reporters
contend that the result-within-the-risk standard is preferable to the substantively
similar reasonable foreseeability test because the former "provides greater clarity,
facilitates clearer analysis in a given case, and better reveals the reason for it
existence."'
On one level, these points ring true. "Reasonable foreseeability" is extremely
broad, open-ended, and impervious to precise definition. However, reasonable
foreseeability does have some intuitive meaning-or, perhaps more accurately,
heavy usage by lawyers and judges has over time attached nuanced and useful
meaning to the phrase.' Uttering the words that "harm must be reasonably
foreseeable for plaintiff to recover" certainly does not answer all questions, but
inexactness is to some extent unavoidable.' Reasonable foreseeability language at
least provides a visual 24 and invites further inquiry as to what the standard means
in the context of a given case.
The result-within-the-risk approach is more precise and provides more
information to a thoughtful listener regarding the reason for its existence. However,
the first reaction of most hearers upon being told that liability does not exist if the
harm that occurred is different from the harms whose risks made the actor's conduct
tortious would be to ask if the phrase could be repeated, and more slowly this time.
At first glance-and we should not fool ourselves into thinking that busy lawyers
and judges will always be willing to go much beyond the first glance in deciding
whether the Restatement's proposed approach is helpful-it is a perplexing,
circuitous riddle. The result-within-the-risk standard is like a puzzle that rewards
(1997).
19. Although courts rarely use the phrase "result-within-the-risk," they sometimes state
proximate cause rules in a manner cousistent with its meaning. An example highlighted by the
proposed Restatement is Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 610 (1st Cir. 1955) which describes
proximate cause as "[confining] the liability ofanegligent actor to thoseharmful consequences which
result from the operation of... a risk, the foreseeability of which rendered the defendant's conduct
negligent" See generallyBASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 29 Reporters' Notes cmt. f.
20. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supranote 3, § 29 cmt. k.
21. Id.
22. Of course, this nuanced meaning developed through heavy usage by legal professionals is
of little benefit to lay people subjected to reasonable foreseeability language injury instructions.
23. Vagueness and proximate cause have long been the closest of friends. "Having no integrated
meaning of its own, [proximate cause's] chameleon quality permits it to be substituted for any one of
the elements of a negligence case when decision on that element becomes difficult. ... No other
formula has found so much affection in the chambers of final authority; none other so nearly does the
work of Aladdin's lamp." Leon Green, ProximateCause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV.

471,471-72 (1950).
24. Pun intended. "[T]here are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee forever ..
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989).
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the patient with a sense of accomplishment when it is cracked, but inflicts
frustration on both the patient and the impatient until then.
This quality of the result-within-the-risk test makes it an effective vehicle for
taking lawyers deeper into the soul of proximate cause when they need or desire to
make such ajourney. Since it focuses "on the particular circumstances that exist[]
at the time of the actor's conduct and the risks . . . posed by that conduct,"' s
thoughtful application of the standard would likely lead to appropriate results more
frequently than use of unanchored reasonable foreseeability language. However,
"thoughtful" is the preceding sentence's bugaboo. When we can avoid it, we
generally prefer not to be overly thoughtful. We generally would prefer to use tried
and true language that we think we already understand, despite its conceptual warts.
The risk, then, is that even though the result-within-the-risk test may be
conceptually superior, judges and lawyers will not use it.
Lest this concern seem overly pessimistic, consider the fate of the first and
second Restatements' attempts to replace the phrase "proximate cause" with "legal
cause." Writers seem virtually unanimous in their condemnation of the phrase
"proximate cause," and virtually unanimous in believing that calling the doctrine
something like "legal cause" makes more sense. 6 However, lawyers and judges
became comfortable with proximate cause language, even if scholars and jurors
were not, and they refused to budge toward the clearly superior Restatement
language. Ominously, the argument for preferring "legal cause" over "proximate
cause" is much easier to follow than the case for replacing "reasonable
foreseeability" with result-within-the-risk language. The precedent of failure where
a change seemed more feasible highlights the challenge for acceptance facing the
result-within-the-risk test.
Despite these concerns, my criticism of the proposed Restatement standard is
muted. As noted above, it is much clearer and more helpful than the earlier
Restatement standards. It does not present major substantive conflicts with the
approach used in most cases. When thoughtfully applied, it presents conceptual
advantages over reasonable foreseeability language. The greatest cost of adopting
the standard is potential irrelevance if courts ignore it, but if one takes the long
view, perhaps limited relevance for the next several years may bloom into
increasing acceptance and usefulness over time.
Of course, concern over irrelevance couldbe eliminated by switching the blackletter rule to reasonable foreseeability, and emphasizing result-within-the-risk
language heavily in the comments. This approach would ensure usage by lawyers
and judges, and would still perform educational and reform functions in explaining
how the reasonable foreseeability test should be applied. If the ALI is intent on

25. See BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 29 cmt. k.
26. See supranotes 4-9 and accompanying text. "Legal cause" can be sensibly used to describe
the limits of a defendant's scope of liability for tortious conduct. However, the first and second
Restatements attempted to apply the term "legal cause" to both cause-in-fact and proximate cause,
creating confusion that has been appropriately criticized. See BASIC PRINCIPLES, supranote 3, § 26
cmt. a (noting that "legal cause" created confusion and was not widely adopted by the courts).
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sticking with risk-within-the-result in the black-letter rule, at the least the Reporters
should prominently emphasize in the comments the relationship between riskwithin-the-result and reasonable foreseeability. Presently it is buried in the eleventh
comment to the black-letter rule. The explanation of the rationale for not using the
phrase "reasonably foreseeable" should be moved from comment k to one of the
first comments.27
Tentative Draft No. 2's new proposal to add the parenthetical "(Proximate
Cause)" after the Chapter's "Scope of Liability" heading would be helpful to
lawyers andjudges.28 It strengthens the Restatement's relevance by highlighting that
the section addresses what is usually called proximate cause, but it also
communicates the point that proximate cause is not the best language available to
describe the appropriate analysis." This addition is particularly important given the
increasing use of computer search engines in legal research. Adding the
parenthetical makes it easier for lawyers and judges who do not know the current
Restatement terminology but who perform a computer database word search for
"proximate cause" to target the basic black-letter rule.
I. STRICTLY SPEAKING, PRODUCTS CASES ARE DIFFERENT
Regardless of whether the proposed Restatement's result-within-the-risk
language is accepted, proximate cause analyses are sometimes different in products
liability cases than in other tort cases. In light of the proposed Restatement,
increasing attention is likely to be focused on these differences, and thus this section
very briefly addresses some ofthe more interesting distinctions that sometimes do
or may arise.
A.

Proximate Cause in Strict Liability Claims

Although some exceptions exist, courts typically do not articulate distinctions
between products liability cases and other tort cases in analyzing proximate cause.
Perhaps because of this, the Restatement (Third) ofTorts: ProductsLiability pays
scant attention to proximate cause issues, noting almost in passing that product
liability causation is subject to "the prevailing rules and principles governing

27. Presently comment a addresses "history" and comment b addresses "proximate cause
terminology and instructions to the jury." Id. § 29 cmts. a,b.
28. I heard this idea suggested at an October 2001 meeting of the ALI Members Consultative
Group for the Basic Principlesproject. I do not recall who made the suggestion, but I applaud its
addition in Tentative Draft No. 2.
29. Interestingly, prior to drafting the ProductsLiability Restatement, its Reporters expressed
support for continued usage of the term "proximate cause," arguing that it will not create confusion
if it is properly explained in a comment. James A.Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed
Revision ofSection 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CoR]ELL L. Rev. 1512, 1535-36
(1992).
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causation in tort.",30 However, the proposed Basic PrinciplesRestatementpoints out
that cases in which strict liability is applied, including manufacturing defect cases,
are different from cases based on negligence. 3' In strict liability cases, the Reporters
note, liability may attach even if harm was not reasonably foreseeable.32 For
example, the owner of an abnormally dangerous animal is strictly liable even if the
owner is justifiably ignorant and believes the animal tame.33 The Reporters indicate
that similar situations arise in manufacturing defect claims based on strict liability. 4
The Reporters use this distinction as an opportunity to argue for the superiority
of the result-within-the-risk approach over the reasonable foreseeability approach.35
Even if a risk is not readily perceived as reasonably foreseeable, the argument goes,
liability may attach under manufacturing defect strict liability by focusing on the
the reasonable
risks created by the defect. 6 This avoids having to manipulate
37
foreseeability concept where it would be an awkward fit.
This explanation raises a dilemma, although the problem may belong more to
the Products Liability Restatement, or perhaps to the courts, than to the Basic
PrinciplesRestatement presently under construction. Under the ProductsLiability
Restatement, strict liability is not limited to manufacturing defects-it is
theoretically available for design defects and warning defects as well. However, the
Products Liability Restatement makes clear that in design and warning cases
liability only attaches to risks that are reasonably foreseeable. 3 No such limitation
is discussed in the ProductsLiability Restatement with regard to manufacturing
defects.39
This distinction presents questions regarding what strict liability means. If it is
truly liability without fault, and liability for manufacturing defects even when harm
is not foreseeable is thus acceptable, should the same not apply for the doctrine
when it is applied to design and warning defects? The answer is that the Products
LiabilityRestatement does not mean to provide much substance when it states that
liability without fault may apply to manufacturers in design and warning claims.
This is hardly a claim of deception against the Products LiabilityRestatement's
Reporters; they made clear their position that design and warning claims should be
treated essentially as negligence actions regardless of the label used, and in effect

30. PRODUCrS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 15; see Henderson & Twerski, supra
note 29, at 1535-36 (reporters supporting use of the term "proximate cause" in an earlier law review
article).
31. BASIC PRINCIPLEs, supra note 3, § 29 cmt. k.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 29 cmt. k.
38. PRODUCrS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 2(b)-(c). The Basic Principles
Reporters note this requirement. See BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 29 cmt. k.
39. PRODUCrS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 2(a).
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limited strict liability for such claims to a "doctrinal label"40 or "rhetorical
preference"'" with only a few more-or-less technical benefits.
This word game perforrnedbythe ProductsLiabilityRestatement(and perhaps,
as the products liability Reporters would likely contend, by the courts) adds
complexity to the Basic PrinciplesRestatement by requiring it to explain that
reasonable foreseeability language does not fit well with strict liability, and that this
problem applies to strict products liability, but wait, not to design and warning strict
products liability. It highlights the inevitable mayhem caused by attempting to
substantively eliminate strict liability from design and warning claims, while
continuing to allow them to be called strict liability.
On the opposite end of the spectrum from limiting most strict liability claims
to a mere rhetorical preference and applying the proximate cause rule just as it
would be applied under negligence, some writers have argued that proximate cause
analyses should be eliminated altogether in strict liability claims. 42 Professor Peter
Zablotsky reasons that applying the result-within-the-risk test necessitates focusing
on foreseeability, that focusing on foreseeability is the hallmark of a negligence
action, and that liability cannot truly be strict when it is enmeshed in negligence
principles. 43 Under this view, other tools, such as the misuse doctrine,' should be
utilized to reign in liability if courts are concerned about being overly harsh on
defendants--proximate cause should not be part of the vocabulary.4 5
This argument, while interesting and provocative, is distant from the reality in
the trenches. The clearest trend in products liability since the 1980s is the erosion
of support for strict liability." In the courts, the legislatures, and the law reviews,
the star of negligence is on the rise, at least in design and warning claims. Where
it has not been expressly rejected, strict liability has been the object of vigorous
chipping and whittling. Since history tends to be cyclical, the doctrine will likely

40. Id. § 2 cmt. n ("Regardless of the doctrinal label attached to a particular claim, design and
warning claims rest on a risk-utility assessment."). Comment i, discussing section 2(c), adopts a
reasonableness test for judging the adequacy of product instructions and warnings. Id. at cmt. i. "It
thus parallels Subsection (b), which adopts a similar standard for judging the safety of product
designs." Id.
41. Id. § 1 cmt. a.
42. See, e.g., Diane Carter Maleson, Negligence is DeadBut Its DoctrinesRule Us From the
Grave: A Proposalto Limit Defendants' Responsibility in Strict ProductsLiabilityActions Without
Resort to Proximate Cause, 51 TEMP. L. Q. 1, 17 (1978) ("[P]roximate cause is a fault doctrine
meaning proximate fault rather than proximate causation.. . ."); Kenneth Vinson, Proximate Cause
Should Be BarredFrom Wandering Outside Negligence Law, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 215, 254-55
(1985) (asserting that proximate cause should be eliminated from strict liability claims and that other
doctrinal devices may be used if courts feel the need to soften the severity of strict liability);
Zablotsky, supranote 12, at 44-46 (stating that applying the proximate cause rule forces a negligence
analysis even if strict liability label is used).
43. See Zablotsky, supra note 12, at 44-46.
44. See infranotes 77-95 and accompanying text.
45. See Zablotsky, supra note 12, at 55.
46. David G. Owen, The FaultPit,26 GA. L. REV. 703, 724 (1992) ("The Great Strict Liability
Experiment in products liability has mostly proved a failure, and its continuing decline... appears
inevitable.').
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rise again some day with a glory akin to that with which it shone in the 1960s, but
that day cannot presently be seen. Given the present antipathy toward the doctrine,
it is unlikely many courts will seek to strengthen it anytime soon through
eliminating the proximate cause requirement.'
In strict products liability's headier days, many jurisdictions undertook to give
added teeth to the doctrine by declaring that risks known by the time of trial would
be imputed to the seller, regardless of whether the seller reasonably knew of the
imputed risks when the product was made or marketed." In courts taking this
approach seriously, performing a routine proximate cause analysis may be
problematic. Proximate cause's requirement of foreseeable harm clashes with the
imputed knowledge of risks test's rejection of foreseeability. If a court accepts the
imputed knowledge of risks approach but also requires plaintiff to establish
proximate cause, it is likely providing a back door to negligence.49
The practical implications of this contradiction are less serious than one might
imagine from counting the number of jurisdictions that have seemingly claimed
allegiance to the imputed knowledge ofrisks test in strict products liability cases.-"
Because manufacturers are held to the standard of an expert in the industry in
determining what risks are foreseeable, situations where a manufacturer could not
reasonably foresee a risk are relatively rare."1 Further, despite the frequency with
which it is invoked in instances where it does not influence the outcome of a case,
the imputed knowledge of risks test is seldom used by courts when using it would
make a difference.5" As noted in the ProductsLiabilityRestatement, "The idea has
not worn well with time." 3 As strict liability has declined, the imputed knowledge
test seems to have evolved in many jurisdictions from a seemingly powerful tool for

47. Some courts have rejected the language, but not the essence, of proximate cause in strict
liability cases. For example, some courts have preferred to use the phrase "producing cause" rather
than proximate cause. See William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposalto Abandon Strict Products
Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 669 (noting that some courts have rejected the "proximate cause"
terminology in strict liability cases, while still examining foreseeability); BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra
note 3, § 29 Reporters' Notes cmt. k (citing Texas cases struggling with proximate cause requirement
in strict products liability cases).
48. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 2 Reporters' Notes cmt. m

(providing critical history of imputed knowledge of risks test).
49. See Powers, supra note 47, at 669 ("It would be a Pyrrhic victory for a plaintiff to win on
the issue of defectiveness, even though the product's risks were unforeseeable, ifthe unforeseeability
of the plaintiff's injury defeated legal causation.").
50. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 2 Reporters' Notes cmt. m (noting
that the imputed knowledge of risks test is in decline).
51. See id. (quoting 4 FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
PRODUCrS LIABILITY 109-110 (1977)). The relatively few cases that involve truly unforeseeable risks
generally involve drugs, chemicals, or toxins that interact with the body in an unforeseeable manner.
See Michael D. Green, Successors and CERLA: The Imperfect Analogy to ProductsLiability andAn
Alternative Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 897, 923, 926-27 (1993) (noting that future liability is
generally not predictable in cases involving hazardous substances such as drugs and asbestos).
52. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 2 Reporters' Notes cmt. m
("Imputation, in cases where it significantly affects defendants' liabilities, appears to have little
support.").

53. Id.
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plaintiffs to merely part of the word game by which courts pretend to apply strict
liability but in truth lean toward negligence.
However, completely dismissing the imputed knowledge of risks test's
significance for proximate cause would be a mistake. Despite criticism from
scholars and the ProductsLiability Restatement, it is sometimes applied even in
cases where a risk might be truly unforeseeable. Sternhagen v. Dow Co.54 is a
notable and fairly recent example. In Sternhagen,the decedent's estate claimed that
exposure to a herbicide manufactured by one ofthe defendants caused the decedent
to develop cancer, resulting in his death.5 The manufacturer claimed that neither
it nor medical science knew or had reason to know that the herbicide caused cancer
when decedent was exposed to it."
Since it involved a toxic substance, Sternhagen is the type of case in which the
risk might be genuinely unforeseeable even under the expert in the industry
standard of knowledge.5 7 Despite this, the court held that under strict liability,
knowledge of all risks must be imputed to the manufacturer, regardless of whether
it knew or should have known of them.58 The court acknowledged that the Products
Liability Restatementand a number of other jurisdictions had rejected the imputed
knowledge of risks test, but it concluded that imputing knowledge is necessary to
preserve the core principles underlying strict products liability. 9
In analyzing the claim, the court rather vaguely noted that causation must be
established, without distinguishing between cause in fact and proximate cause.6"
However, after asserting that imputing knowledge of unknowable risks "does not
change the requirements of plaintiff's prima facie case, 61 the court declared that
foreseeability has no place in a strict liability analysis. 62 Requiring that risks be
63
foreseeable "would inject negligence principles into strict liability law.
Something has to give in a case like Sternhagen,where the court both embraces
proximate cause and rejects requiring foreseeability of harm. In such a case
proximate cause may either serve as a back door for considering foreseeability or
may be given mere lip service and then ignored. The Sternhagen court apparently
chose the latter option, declining to address how its rejection of foreseeability

54. 935 P.2d 1139 (Mont. 1997).
55. Id. at 1140.
56. Id.
57. See supranote 51 and accompanying text.
58. Sternhagen, 935 P.2d at 1142, 1144-45.
59. Id. at 1147.
60. Id. at 1143. In referencing the causation issue the court cited Brown v. North American
Manufacturing Co., an earlier Montana Supreme Court decision that focused on when contributory
negligence prevents plaintiffs from establishing proximate cause. Id. (citing Brown v. N. Am. Mfg.
Co., 576 P.2d 711,716 (Mont. 1978)). The Brown court held that "[a] showing of proximate cause is
a necessary predicate to plaintiff's recovery in strict liability. Strict liability is, of course, not complete
'liability without fault' in the sense that it is completely immune to considerations of plaintiff's
conduct." Brown, 576 P.2d at 719; see also infra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
61. Sternhagen,935 P.2d at 1143.
62. Id. at 1143-44.
63. Id. at 1144.
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squared with requiring proof of proximate cause. However, despite the Sternhagen
court's failure to openly confront the issue, requiring proximate cause is
problematic whenever a jurisdiction solidly adheres to the imputed knowledge of
risk test.
Using a consumer expectations test for analyzing claims of
defectiveness-another jurisdictional approach to strict liability-also presents
interesting proximate cause issues. Although the ProductsLiability Restatement
argues that a risk-utility standard should be used in design and warning cases,"
some courts instead hold that a product is defective if it does not meet reasonable
consumer expectations with regard to safety.65 Some jurisdictions apply this
standard regardless66of whether the claim is described as a manufacturing, design,
or warning defect.
If a court uses a true consumer expectations defect analysis rather than riskutility, 67 the proximate cause element holds special importance. When risk-utility
is used, foreseeability of harm is part of the defectiveness test. One could argue,
then, that under a risk-utility analysis defendants get two bites at the foreseeability
apple: one in the defectiveness element and another in the proximate cause
element. 61 Thus, if proximate cause were eliminated as an element in strict liability
actions in jurisdictions using a risk-utility defectiveness test, the practical
consequences might be less than dramatic. As with the duty element in negligence,
the defectiveness element in strict products liability could be an alternative outlet
for restricting the scope of liability even if proximate cause were not listed as part
of the prima facie case.
Using a consumer expectations test places more significance on the proximate
cause element because its foreseeability analysis is not redundant-or at least its
redundancy is not as obvious. Courts applying the approach focus on "reasonable"
consumer expectations, and any standard incorporating a reasonableness
requirement cannot be completely divorced from foreseeability. However, the focus
in a consumer expectations test is on consumers rather than the seller, and thus at
least theoretically its foreseeability component would be one step removed from
that employed in a proximate cause analysis. Therefore, proximate cause plays a
more important role when consumer expectations is used as a defectiveness test. If
arguments that proximate cause should be eliminated in strict liability actions were

64. See PRODUCrS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 2(b)-(c).

65. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law ofProducts Liability: The ALI Restatement
Project,48 VAND. L. REv. 631, 666 (1995).
66. See id. at 665-67.
67. Some cases appear to treat consumer expectations and risk-utility as functionally equivalent,
utilizing consumer expectations rhetoric but applying risk-utility balancing to determine whether
reasonable expectations are met. See PRODucrs LIABILITY RETATEMENT, supra note 18, § 2

Reporters' Notes cmt. d(II)(c).
68. See Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts, ProductsLiability, Section 2(b):
Design Defect, 68 TEMP.L. REV. 167, 184 (1995) ("By requiring 'foreseeability of risk' (proximate
cause) in addition to the balancing of foreseeability that will occur under the risk-utility label, the
reporters are asking the judge and jury to answer the scope-of-liability question twice.").
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heeded, the effect would be particularly powerful in consumer expectations

jurisdictions.
Plaintiffs' challenges in convincing courts to eliminate proximate cause from
strict liability cases, to apply a consumer expectations test rather than risk-utility,
or to impute knowledge of unforeseeable risks, may be eclipsed by a much more
fundamental, yet counterintuitive, difficulty. Plaintiffs should only press for a strict
liability standard if it helps them. However, it may in fact hurt them. In many cases
plaintiffs may have better results using a negligence theory, even with its strong
emphasis on foreseeability.
Although strict products liability was created with the expectation that it would
be superior over negligence for plaintiffs, fairly early in its history a debate arose
regarding how much it actually helps plaintiffs. In 1974, attorney Paul Rheingold
argued that more plaintiffs would prefer to present their products liability cases to
jurors with negligence language than with strict liability language.69 He reasoned
that it is easier for a plaintiff to prevail by showing that defendant did something
wrong than by showing that there is something technically defective about a
product: "In McLuenesque terms negligence is 'hot' and strict liability is 'cold."' 7 °
Others have argued to the contrary that strict liability language is more favorable
for plaintiffs, 71 but the weight of scholarly opinion, as well as a recently completed
empirical study, seem to support Mr. Rheingold's view that negligence language
is typically better for plaintiffs than strict liability language.72

69. Paul D. Rheingold, The ExpandingLiabilityof the ProductSupplier: A Primer,2 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 521, 531 (1974).
70. Id.
71. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, DoctrinalCollapsein ProductsLiability:
The Empty Shell ofFailureto Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 276 (1990) ("Perhaps the only practical
difference between negligence and strict liability cases is that juries occasionally will be harder on
defendants when applying a strict liability instruction than they would be when holding them to the
standard of an expert in the field."); see, e.g., Randy E. Barnette, A Consent Theory of Contract,86
COLUM. L. REv. 269, 306 n.152 (1986) (citing authority that the doctrine of strict liability creates a
presumption in favor of the plaintiff); KevinM. Clermont& Theodore Eisenberg,Do Case Outcomes
Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction,83 CORNELL
L. RV. 581, 588 (1998) (stating that the legal criterion for strict liability highly favors plaintiffs);
Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An InstitutionalEvolutionistPerspective, 80 CORNELL L.REV. 941 947
(1995) (arguing that particularly in the area of products claims, strict liability favors plaintiffs).
72. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric ofStrict ProductsLiability Versus
Negligence: An EmpiricalAnalysis,77 N.Y.U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (analyzing study in which
306 jurors were shown videotapes of design defect minitrial; although factually and functionally
identical in use of a risk-utility defect test, some jurors' videotapes used strict liability language, and
otherjurors' videotapes used negligence language;jurors responded more favorably to plaintiffwhen
shown the negligence verison); see also id. (describing responses to a question presented to
distinguished panelists at a products liability conference regarding whether plaintiffs should prefer
negligence or strict liability language); Anita Bernstein, How CanaProductbeLiable?,45 DuKEL.J.
1, 10 n.31 (1995) (citing cases in which "courts rejected or ignored strict products liability as a
descriptive label yethad no trouble finding in favor ofplaintiffs using negligence reasoning"); Martin
A. Kotler, Utility,Autonomy andMotive: A DescriptiveModel of the Development of Tort Doctrine,
58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1231,1234 (1990) ("[P]laintiffs' attorneys will attempt to prove fault, if possible
on the facts, rather than engage in the niceties of a strict liability case"); William C. Powers, Jr., The
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Whether this potential psycho/linguistic advantage of negligence outweighs
what would be, for plaintiffs, the happy prospect of being able to dump troublesome
proximate analyses through pleading strict liability, is open to debate.73 However,
it is at least an added complication to an already uphill argument. The waning of
strict liability-perhaps not only with courts and scholars, but also even with
plaintiffs' lawyers-makes this basis for distinguishing between products liability
and other cases in proximate cause analyses much less powerful than it might have
been twenty-five years ago.
B. Misuse and Contributory or ComparativeNegligence
Comment n of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, drafted
when contributory negligence was still a complete defense to negligence claims,
sought to soften the doctrine by asserting that under strict liability in tort
contributory negligence should not bar recovery when the negligence consists
solely of failing to discover or guard against the possibility of a product's defect. 74
However, with the rise of comparative liability, the presence of some fault on the
part of the plaintiff does not necessarily end the analysis in negligence or in strict
products liability. In addition to the possibility of reducing or eliminating plaintiffs
recovery as part of the affirmative defense, inquiry now must also be made
regarding whether plaintiff s negligence was a superceding intervening cause under
the proximate cause doctrine.75 Interaction between contributory negligence and
proximate cause is being addressed, doubtless with exceeding skill and insight, by
Professor Michael Green in his contribution to this Symposium, 76 and thus in my
Essay I will limit myself to merely noting it.
A related issue arises with regard to the misuse doctrine, and I will provide only
a few observations. Courts typically hold that misuse of a product bars recovery if
the misuse is not reasonably foreseeable.77 Several courts have interpreted the

PersistenceofFaultin ProductsLiability, 61 TEx.L. REV. 777,808-09 (1983) (asserting thatbecause

jurors are less familiar with strict liability concepts than with fault, courts wanting to implement strict
liability should do so with doctrinal rules); Frank J. Vandall,ApplyingStrictLiabilityto Professionals:
Economic and Legal Analysis, 59 IND. L. J. 25, 45 (1983) ("[T]here is some feeling that damage

verdicts in strict liability cases might be lower than in negligence cases.").
73. Other possible advantages of strict liability, such as being able to sue all of the sellers in the
chain of distribution, also play into the mix. For a discussion of the primarily technical potential
benefits of strict liability, and citation of authorities discussing these potential benefits, see Cupp &
Polage, supra note 72.

74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965); see also BASIC PIuNCIPLES, supra
note 3, § 33 cmt. c.
75. See BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 33 cmt. c.

76. Michael D. Green, The UnanticipatedRipples of Comparative Negligence: Superseding
Cause in ProductsLiability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002).
77. See David G. Owen, Products Liability: User Misconduct Defenses, 52 S.C. L. REV. 1,48
(2001). Professor Owen provides an excellent discussion of the misuse doctrine's background, its
vague reliance on reasonable foreseeability, and its relationship to proximate cause. Id. at 45-55.
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misuse analysis as often being equivalent to a proximate cause inquiry.7" Professors
James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, the Products Liability Restatement's
Reporters, argue that this is usually the case.79 If the misuse is extreme, they assert,
the defendant may be able to argue that the product was not defective."0 However,
more commonly the plaintiff is able to establish a defect, and then the question
"becomes whether the harn was within the risk created by the defective product.
Stated in this way, the issue is that of proximate cause."'"
Certainly the similarity between the misuse doctrine and the proximate cause
requirement in cases involving products that were both defective and misused is
striking. But for misuse to be a subset ofproximate cause in such cases, the burden
of proving an absence of unforeseeable misuse must be on the plaintiff. The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving proximate cause, and thus for the doctrines to
overlap the plaintiff must maintain the same burden of proof regarding misuse.
Courts are divided regarding whether the burden of proof for misuse lies with
the plaintiff or the defendant.8 2 Most courts treat misuse as an affirmative defense,
requiring the defendant to prove that the product was unforeseeably misused to
escape liability." Other courts put the burden on the plaintiff to establish as part of
her prima facie case that the product was not unforeseeably misused.' In the
affirmative defense jurisdictions misuse is less of a friend to defendants than is
proximate cause, while in the prima facie jurisdictions it seems to overlap with the
proximate cause analysis.8 5
The overlap between proximate cause and unforeseeable misuse has been cited
in the arguments for eliminating an independent proximate cause analysis in strict
liability cases. Under this view, "ample protection" is provided for defendants

78. See, e.g., Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Iowa 1980) (holding that
misuse is not an affirmative defense, but rather an aspect of proximate cause and defectiveness
analysis). See generally Owen, supra note 77, at 47 (noting that early decisions were particularly
likely to phrase misuse as a proximate cause issue); Zablotsky, supra note 12, at 56 (describing the
Hughes case and its analysis of the relationship between proximate cause and misuse).
79. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 29, at 1545-46.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. See, e.g., PRODUCrSLIABILnYREsTATEMENT, supranote 18, § 2cmt p ("Jurisdictions differ
on the question of who bears the burden of raising and introducing proof regarding conduct that
constitutes misuse, modification, and alteration."). Professor Zablotsky asserts that as of the mid1990s twenty-nine states had specifically addressed the allocation of burden regarding misuse, and
that seventeen of these twenty-nine place the burden on the defendant. He describes placing the

burden on the defendant as the "clear trend." Zablotsky, supra note 12, at 56-58. Professors David
Owen, Stuart Madden, and Mary Davis assert that the burden ofproof is at least theoretically on the
plaintiff in most states, but note that in all but one of the several states that have enacted statutory
reform ofmisuse, itis defined as an affirmative defense. See 2DAvID G. OwEN, M. STEWARTMADDEN,
& MARY J. DAvis, MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTs LIABILiTY § 14:4 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter 2
MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODucrs LIABLn].
83. 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILrY, supra note 82, § 14.4.

84. Id.
85. Id.
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against unforeseeable manner of harm by the misuse doctrine, and for this and other
reasons 86 proximate cause should not be required under strict products liability.87
As noted above, any arguments for strengthening strict liability in tort, through
eliminating the proximate cause requirement or through other means, are likely to
face a chilly judicial reception given the current trend away from strict liability.88
But even if courts were more friendly to strict liability, at least two problems
confront efforts to focus on the misuse doctrine as an appropriate substitute for
proximate cause. The first problem stems from the jurisdictional split regarding the
burden of proof on misuse. Jurisdictions treating misuse as an affirmative defense
demand more from defendants than is demanded of them under proximate cause.89
If it were to be viewed as some sort of substitute for proximate cause, it would have
to be with the recognition that in these jurisdictions plaintiffs would get a double
boost-ridding themselves of a formal and separate proximate cause analysis, and
shifting the burden of proof on foreseeability as well.
Second, although when treated as part of the prima facie case, misuse often
overlaps with proximate cause, it is only a relatively small region of the proximate
cause universe. Courts use the proximate cause element to analyze a wide range of
issues, including the foreseeability of the person injured, the foreseeability of the
type of injury sustained, and the foreseeability of the manner in which the injury
was sustained. 90 Courts also routinely analyze the foreseeability of a wide range of
intervening acts to determine whether they should be deemed superceding under the
facts of the case presented. 9' Misuse addresses only one of these many facets of
proximate cause. Under proximate cause, a plaintiff's contributory negligence is
usually analyzed as a type of intervening cause.92 Further, it should rarely be
considered superceding, particularly since the development of comparative liability
has provided courts a vehicle for reducing plaintiff's recovery when she is partially
at fault rather than eliminating recovery altogether."
Thus, the misuse doctrine overlaps with only a small portion of potential
proximate cause issues, and even in that small portion it should only lead to a
finding of no proximate cause in a relatively small percentage of cases. In this light,
asking misuse to serve as a substitute for proximate cause in strict products liability
cases is a tall order.94

86. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
87. See Zablotsky, supra note 12, at 55.
88. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
90. See Zablotsky, supranote 12, at 43-45.
91. See BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 33 cmt. b.
92. Id. at cmt. c.
93. Id. ("[E]mploying superceding cause to bar a plaintiff's recovery based on the plaintiff's
conduct is difficult to reconcile with modem notions of comparative responsibility.").
94. Of course, that misuse could replace proximate cause in a relatively small percentage of
proximate cause cases could serve as one limited argument for eliminating proximate cause in strict
products liability-but one would need other and more powerful arrows in the quiver to make the
argument convincing.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Assuming it is adopted, time will tell whether the proposed Restatement's
result-within-the-risk language will clarify thinking about proximate cause or
whether it will share the fate ofirrelevance suffered by some of the first and second
Restatements' proximate cause pronouncements. If history is a guide, the outlook
is not hopeful, at least in the short term. Among other possibilities, shifting the
black-letterrule's language to reasonable foreseeability and emphasizing the resultwithin-the-risk test in the comments would ensure relevance while still providing
education and reform.
Specifically applied to defective products claims, the most interesting
proximate cause issues arise in the context of strict liability. Inclusion of the
element unquestionably injects a flavor of negligence through its focus on
reasonable foreseeability. However, the present trend is to dilute strict liability with
more than a mere flavor of negligence, and thus limitations on proximate cause in
strict liability are unlikely to be adopted by a large number ofjurisdictions anytime
soon. Even in manufacturing defect cases, where maintaining strict liability
generates the least controversy, courts are likely to continue by and large to apply
common-sense restrictions on the scope of liability with the help of reasonable
foreseeability language.
Thus, although some arguments for distinctions may be made, from a doctrinal
perspective products liability proximate cause is not likely to receive significantly
different treatment from the majority of courts in the foreseeable future. However,
an important pragmatic distinction may be arising in a narrow range of cases with
extremely powerful impact-government-sponsored medical reimbursement
lawsuits against product manufacturers. Under any standard, causation was quite
remote in the states' medical reimbursement claims against tobacco manufacturers,
but the manufacturers still felt compelled to provide what was by far the largest
settlement in history.9" Although the settlement may not have created legal

precedent, the amount of money paid and the attention paid to the cases may as a
practical matter invite loosening of proximate cause restrictions in the resolution of
other large government-sponsored medical reimbursement claims.96
Perhaps the treatment of proximate cause in the government tobacco cases
provides an appropriate closing illustration of lawyers' decidedly utilitarian
approach to the doctrine. In these cases, both sides surely focused much more on
simply trying to apply the doctrine in a way that would help them prevail than on
mastering its abstract subtleties. The plaintiffs' lawyers presumably were not
concerned about theoretical difficulties with proximate cause in their cases,

95. See generallyVictorE. Schwartz, The Remoteness Doctrine:A RationalLimit on Tort Law,

8 COIRNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 421, 439-43 (1999) (discussing the application of the remoteness
doctrine to state attorney general suits against the tobacco industry).
96. See id. at 439-40.
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provided they could somehow nonetheless prevail and feel that justice was done.97
Similarly, both under negligence and under strict liability, lawyers might be
unconcerned about whether reasonable foreseeability language is theoretically
inferior to result-within-the-risk language, provided it continues to be perceived as
the most accessible approach to working with proximate cause.

97. It is not my intent to assert unethical conduct by plaintiffs' attorneys in these cases. Of
courseif they believed there was no good faith argument for proximate cause, they could not ethically
pursue the case. However, proximate cause's flexibility would seem to remove a good faith argument
for its existence in only the rarest of cases.
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